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BANKS

AND

BAKING-CoNsTITUTIONAL

LAw-PoWER

OF

NATIONAL

BANKS TO ACT AS EXEC.TORs.-The Burnes National Bank, appointed executor by a will, petitioned the Supreme Court of Missouri for a writ of
mandamus to the proper probate court, directing the latter 'to issue letters
testamentary to the Bank. A statute of IMissouri was construed by the Supreme Court of that stite as excluding national and state 'banks from so
acting. The Court refused to issue the writ. Bunes National Bank v. Duncan, 257 S. W. 784 (IMo. z924). The Bank appealed. Held: The national
bank could act as executor despite the inhibition of the state statute. Justices Sutherland and 'McReynolds dissented. Burnes Aational Bank v. Duncan, 265 U. S. 17 (1924).
The Federal Reserve Act, Act of December 23, 1913. c, 6. sec. ix, par.
K: 38 STAT. AT L 25x, empowered the Federal Reserve Board "to grant by
special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of state or local law, the right to act as . . . executors." This provision
was amended. Act of September 26. 1918, 40 STAT. AT L. 967. and the follo i-'ng clause was added: "Whenever the laws of such state authorize or
pelmit the exercise of any or all of the foregoing powers by state banks,
trust companies, or other corporations which compete with natienal banks, the
granting to and exercise of such powers by national banks shall not be
deemed to be in contravention of state or local law."
The dissenting justices believe the amendment is unconstitutional, basing
their reasoning upon the fact that the devolution and administration of decedents" estates are matters exc!usively within state jurisdiction. See Byen's
T'. ie.1uley. 149 U. S. 6u8 (i893); Tilt v. Kelsey, 20 U. S. 43 (1907).
Therefore, they contend, Congress may not impose its will upon the states
in their choice of administrators and executors. But it is submitted that
the opinion of the majority is correct and that the amendment is valid. It
has long been settled that Congress may establish national banks, as a suitable means for carrying into effect the other powers granted to it by the
Constitution. McCulloch ze. Mlarvland, 4 Wheat. 416 (U. S. 18ig). Congress may grant to these natonal banks such powers as are appropriate to
their business. Osborn v. Bank of United States. 9 Wheat. 73S (U. S. 1824).
Where the competitors of national banks are permitted to exercise fiduciary
powers, these powers have become an incident to the business of banking,
and may therefore be conferred by Congress upon national banks. National
That the state law forbids national
Bank v. Fellows, 244 U. S. 416 (917).
banks to exercise such powers should make no difference, since in any field
in which Congress has the right to legislate, its will is supreme. See Davis
v. Elmira Savinqs Bank, 161 U. S. 2;5 (1896); Van Reed v. Peoples Xational Bank, 198 U. S. 554 (19o).
BANKS AND BAKING--STATE ISTITUTION BECOMING .*.IO.AL BANXRiGcnr To Act AS ExF.CvToR.-The testator died leaving a will which
named a trust company his executor. Prior to his death the company had
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become a national bank and had then consolidated with another national
bank. On the testator's death the company in its new name petitioned
the court to grant it letters testamentary. Held: Petition refused. Petition
of Coinmnonwealth-,flantic National Bank of Boston, 144 N. E. 443 (Mass.
1924).
It is now quite clear that, whatever state law may provide in the matter,
probate courts .must appoint federally incorporated national banks to fiduciary capacities in exactly the same manner in which they app6int their own
state incorporated banks or trust companies. First .at'l. Bank of Bay City
v. Fellows, 244 U. S. 416 (1917) ; Missouri -r. Duncan, -"65 U. S. 17 (924).

The court in the instant case accepts this in principle but distinguishes
the case on the ground that the petitioning national bank is not the person
named in the will. As to just what happens when a corporation reorganizes under a new charter or merges with another similar corporation the law
is not quite clear. Some cases consider that the new corporation is a continuance of the old. Metropolitan Bank z.Cla.gett, 14i U. S. 52o (i89!).
Others treat it as a new entity which automatically assumes all the rights
and liabilities of the old. Atlantic .Vat'l. Bank v,.
Harris. 118 Mass. 147
(1875); Matter of Bergdorf, 206 N. Y. 3o9, 99 X. E..714 (1912). But irrespective of the theory, all hold that the new organization has evqrything
the old one had. City Bank v. Phelps, 97 N. Y. 44 (1834) ; McCarthy v. Liberty Nat'l. Bank, 175 Pac. 94o (Okla. x918) ; Prop'rs., etc., z.Boston & Afaine
R. R., 245 Mass. 52, 139 N. E. 839 (1923). Nor has there been any distinction made where the change was from a state to a federally incorporated
organization. In fact, all the cases on this point have said very firmly that
it is one and the same corporation. Coffey v. National Bank of Missouri,
46 Mo. 140 (i87o); City Bank v. Phelps, supra; Metropolitan Bank v. Claggelt, supra.
While the court in the instant case agrees with the foregoing principles,
it considers that the appointment of an executor is not the sort of thing
that can pass to the new organization. This view was discussed and rejected
in several instances where the change was from one state organization to
another. Matter of Bcrgdorf, supra; Chicago, etc., Co. v. Zinser, 264 Ill.
31, xo5 N. E. 718 (1914). In the case in Illinois it was pointed out that
a testator who appoints a corporate executor must expect changes in the
control of the organization and in the public regulation of such activities
and takes that risk. The Massachusetts court itself does not consider it
material that following the merger the identity of the individuals in control
of the bank is materially different. But it does claim that, since it is incorporated under different authority and subject to a somewhat different
system of regulation, it is not sufficiently the same organization for it tb.
appoint it executor under the will. Such a position would require the court
to hold. if the legislature of Massachusetts should materially change the
regulations for trust companies, that no trust company could subsequently
be appointed executor under a will executed prior to the enactment. It is
submitted that, in view of the fact that reorganization of corporate entities
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under new charters, has in no case been permitted to affect any other rights
or liabilities which accrued previously, the petition submitted should have
been granted.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-POWER Or Aro txEy TO CONFESS JuDGMENT.-Judgment was confessed in Illinois under a power of attorney contained in a
note executed in Indiana, but made payable in Illinois. By statute in Indiana
judgment could be confessed only upon written authority, including an affidavit that the debt was owing. (B.'RNs' Axx. Ixn. STS. 1914, sec. 615, Ioo4.)
The plaintiff brought suit on the judgment in Indiana. Held: (two dissents) The Illinois judgment, is not entitled to full faith and credit. Egley v.
T. B. Bennctt & Co., x44 N. E. 533 (Ind. 1924).
Analysis of the above case discloses that its decision depends upon the
answer to two questions: (x) what law governs the validity of the power of
attorney to confess judgment? (2) how does that law regard such a power
of attorney?
Where a contract entered into in one state is to be performed in another,
there is wide diversity of opinion as to what law will determine its validity.
23 HARv. L. Rrv. 1,79, 194, 26o. Some jurisdictions take the view that the
intention of the parties is to be the controlling factor; In re Mlfissouri S. S.
Co., L. R. 42 Ch. Div. 321 (&Q.)) ; others .hold that the contract is governed
by the law of the place where it is to be performed; Krantz v. Kacenstein,
22 Pa. Super. 275 (igo3) ; Vennum v. M1ertens, 119 Mo. App. 461, 91 S. IV.
2W (i9o6) ; a third class regard it as determined by the law of the place
where it is executed. Scudder v. Union National Bank, 91 U. S. 406 (t875);
Acme Food Co. v. Kirsch, 166 Mich. 433, 131 N. W. i123 (i91). The last
view mentioned was adopted by the court in the principal case. It is the
one supported by the authorities, and, it is submitted, is the preferable view.
MINOR. CoNFLICt OF LAWS, 411; TIERNAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 29.

If a clause in a contract is 'invalid under the law governing the validity
of that contract, the general rule is that it is invalid everywhere. Orr's Adm.
v. Orr, 157 Ky. 570, I63 S. W. 757 (1914) ; MINoR, CoNFLiCT OF LAWS, 402.
A different result arises, however, where the clause in question is not void
under the governing law, but only unenforceable. In such a case it does not
necessarily follow that another jurisdiction which recognizes such a provision
is not at liberty to enforce it. Shclnlerdine -.- Lippincott, 69 N. J. L. 82, 54
At. 237 (i9o3); and see 38 L R. A. (N. S.) 8x4. It has been held that a
warrant of attorney to confess judgment goes to the remedy. Hamilton v.
Schoenberger, 47 Iowa 385 (1877); Mason V. Ward, So Vt. 29o. 67 AtL 820
(i9o7).
If the governing law does not declare the warrant of attorney void,
but only refuses to enforce such authority, and enforcement is sought in another
jurisdiction, the question of whether effect will be given to the authority will
depend upon the laws of the latter jurisdiction, under the established principle that stipulations in a contract referring to the remedy will be governed
by the law where the remedy is sought. MINOR, Cu.;ruLCT OF LAWS, sec. ,o$;
6Shelmcrdine v. Lippincott, supra.

RECENT CASES

99

At common law confession of judgment under power of attorney
without process on the defendant was not permitted.

I BLACK ON JUDGMENTS,

sec. ro. In the absence of statute authorizing such confession, there is great
conflict of authority as to the validity of such a power of attorney. ANN.
CASES 1914-A, 646. In some jurisdict.ons it is held to be void as against
public policy because it gives the defendant no day in court, and puts him
at the mercy of the party in whose favor the power operates. First National
Bank v.
h'hite,
220 1o. 717, 120 S. NV. 36 (19o9); Farqular& Co. -,.Deha'Tn, 70 W. Va. 738. 75 S. E. 65 (i912). This was the view taken by the
majority of the court in the principal case. Other courts uphold the validity
of the power of attorney on the ground that it constitutes a waiver by the
defendant of his right to have process served upon him. Saunders v. Lipscomb, go Va. 647, 19 S. E. 450 (1894) ; tazel v.. Jacobs, 78 N'. J.L 459, 75
Atl. 903 (igio). Of course, if the clause is void, judgment confessed under
it in another jurisdiction would not be binding elsewhere, but could be attacked collaterally. Pennoyer i,.Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1887).
Under a statute similar to the one in Indiana which required the authority to be in an instrument separate from the main obligation, it has been held
that combining the two did not make the authority void, but only unenforceable, and that a judgment upon such power of attorney coming from another
state could not be impeached. Slhhnerdie v. Lippincott. supra. But see contra, Aciec Food Co. v. Kirsch, supra. However, it is submitted that the instant case was correctly decided, in view of the fact that the statute -in
question did not authorize such a warrant of attorney, and the further fact
that the public policy of the state, as evidenced in earlier cases involving
similar principles, was opposed to its validity. See Maitland.v. Reed, 37 Ind.
App. 469, 77 N. E. 29o (igos).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-REPEAL OF STATUTE OF L.1,1TATION.S.

-The plaintiff's husband was killed because of the negligence'of the defendant. For two years after his death. she- received compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Then the provision applying to her was declared unconstitutional. The statute of limitations had by that time run
against a tort action, but the Legislature passed an act enabling those affected
by the decision to bring suit within one year. The plaintiff sued under the
statute. Held: (Three judges dissenting) Judgment for the plaintiff. Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock and Repair Co., cl al., 238 N. Y. 271, 144 N. E. 578
(1924).
The question of whether the defense of the statute of limitations is such
a property right that its loss by a repeal of the statute is guarded against
by the due process clause of the Constitution is a subject of conflicting decisions. It is undoubtedly true that title to real property or chattels acquired
by adverse possession 'isunaffected by any change in the statute. Moore v.
Imce, _9 Pa. 262 (857). The Supreme Court of the United States in Canmpbell '. Holt, ii5 U. S. 62o (x88s), distinguished between ownership in property gained by adverse possession and the right to the defense of the statute
in actions of tort and contract. In the latter actions, it was said, the statute
bars the remedy and not the right; the statute is a matter of public policy
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and may be set aside. This view was later qualified and was held applicable
only to such laws as were intended to remedy a mischief and to promote
public justice. lVinfree v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 227 U. S. 296 (1913)
Petitiom of Canadian Pacific Railway Co,, 278 Fed. 197 (D. C. 1921).
A minority of the states are in accord with the rule of Campbell . Holt.
.llcEldonwey z. Iyatt, 44 W. Va. 7xi, 30 S. E. 2.39 (18.8) ; Orman v. Van
Arsdell, 12 N. M. 344, 78 Pac. 48 (x9o4). A majority, however, agree with

the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley that a complete defense under
the statute is property within the protection of the due process guarantee,
since, there beijig 'no right with'out a remedy, the destruction of the remedy
destroys the right. Rockport v, Walden, 54,N. H. 167 (1874) ; Moore v. State,
43 N. J. L. 2o3 (1881); Lazrence v. Lonistille, 96 Ky. 595, 29 S. NV. 450
(ISq;). Massachusetts, unwilling to adopt Campbell v. Holt, but feeling that

iijustice would result from too strict a following of the opposite rule, decided in Danforth z, Groton W'ater Co., 178 Mass. 472, 59 N. F_ 1033 (i9ox),
affirmed in Dunbar z. B. & P. R. R., 181 Mass. 383, 63 N. E. 916 (19o2),
that, where the defense was based on a mere technicality, the court has discretion to decide whether or not it is' within the due process clause. In the
principal case, the New 'ork court adopts the Massachusetts view. It is submitted that it was inf'uenced to do so by the nature of the case before it,
and that the dissenting opinion in Campbell v. Holt lays down the logical rule.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-VALIDITY

OF DECLARATORY

JUDGM?!ENT

AcT.-The.

Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act provides that "any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, . . . may have determined any question
of construction or validity arising under the instrument." Under this act,
which had been adopted by Tennessee, PuB. AcTs 1923, Chap. 29, the plain-

tiff asked for a declaration of her rights under a will, which rights the defendant had denied but not invaded. The defendant questioned the validity of
the statute. Held: The act is constitutional.

'lTenn.

Miller v. Miller, 261 S. NV. 965

1924).

It is clear that unless this act requires of the courts only what comes within
the scope of their constitutional grant of judicial power it is invalid, for the

legislature cannot give the courts powers and duties not lying within that
grant. Mlayburn's Case, 2 DalI., 409 (U. S. 1792) ; Shephard v. W17heeling, 30
AN'.Va. 479, 4 S. E. 625 (1887) ; Moreau t,. Freeholders. 68 N'.J. L. 480, 53
Atl. _,08(59o2).
Thus it has been held that the courts cannot (by legislative act alone) be required to give advisory opinions on moot questions
of undisputed rights as to which their decisions can have no binding effect.
L*aited Stales t. Es'ans. 213 U. S. 29f (igop); Lonergan v. Goodman, 241
Ill. .oo, 89 N. E. 349 (o09);
f. 12 C. J. 871. But between this situation
and the common case calling for compensatory damages for rights already
violated, there is an intermediate stage, in which there is a real dispute

l'tween the parties as to rights which, however, have not yet been vioklted. It is this situation that the declaratory judgment acts are intended
to Cove.
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In Aniray v. Grand Rapids Ry. CO., 211 Mich. 592, z79 N. W. 350
(92o), a broadly phrascd act was held unconstitutional in a case involv-

ing the construction of d contract contemplated but not yet executed. *The
co:urt said that since it could not make a binding judgment it could not
take jurisdiction of the case; and held the entire act invalid on the ground
that it required the court to do so something outside of its grant of judicial power. See x2 A. L. R. So. 6 A. B. A. JoUR. 145; 21 CoL. L, REv. ii5
and i8.
Several statutes passed after this decision were so worded that
they apply only to actions respecting rights which already exist and are
in actual controversy but which have not been violated. These have been
held constitutional. State v. Grove, io0 Kan. 619, 2o Pac. 82 (192i);
Flakeslee v. Wilson, i9o Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495 (1923) ; Braman z. Babcock,
98 Conn. 549, 2o Ati. 15o (1923).
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. approved by the .American
Bar Association in 1922, is similarly worded, and provides that the court
may refuse judgment whenever it feels that its decision will not settle
the controversy. (See. 6.) This act has .been adopted in Colorado, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Wyoming. Since Colorado's constitution provides for such matters, the constitutional question was not raised
there. Colorado 61 Utah Coal Co. v. Walter, 2_,6 Pac. 864 (19.24). In
Pennsylvania the act has not come before the Supreme Court, but in one
lower court decision under the act the judgment was rendered without
question, Snaz'ely's Estate, 4 D. & C. 405 (Pa. 1924), and in another it
was refused merely on the ground that the case belonged to the Common
Pleas rather than the Orphans' Court, Duff's Estate. 4 D. & C. Reps. 31S
(Pa. 1924). The principal case is the first in which the validity of the
Uniform Act has been discussed, and the decision is entirely in accord with
the principles laid down in the. cases on the other Declaratory Judgment
Acts.
CONTRACTS-CONsTRt(.-TIo--DEFAL'LTXvG

PARTY

PRM1t T.D To

RECOvER.

-The defendant entered into a contract for the purchase of Japanese peas;
one of the clauses of which provided that "if the seller made default in
shipping, . . . the contract should be closed by invoicing back the goods at
such price, whether higher or lower than the contract price, as the London
Corn Exchange should determine; that the said association should, if requested by either party, declare the closing price and this price should be
accepted as final by all parties." The seller failed to ship any peas under
the contract and applied to the association to declare a closing price. Because of a falling market the price determined upon left a balance in the
seller's favor. Held: In spite of his default and failure to fill any part
of the contract the seller was entitled to recover this balance. (Scrutton, L.1.,
dissents) Lancaster v. F. J. Turner 6&Co., (1924) 2 1. B. 22Z,
This case presents the unusual situation of a seller profiting from his involuntary default. The court was confronted with the task of either construing the contract strictly or adopting some means to avoid what seems an
unequitable result. The general rule is that a contract should be interpreted

102

UNI'ERSITY OF PEXYASYLP",NIA LAW REVIEW

reasonably; Stern v. Archibald, 151 Cal. 22o, go Pac: 536 (1907) ; Bingell v.
Royal Insurance Co., 24o Pa. 412, 87 Atl. 955 (1913) ; McDonald v. Aetna Indr-nnity Co.. go Conn. 226, 96 Atl. 926 (ig96); and should be construed to
avoid unjust or absurd results. Barnsdall Oil Co. -,. Leahy, 195 Fed. 731, 1I3 C.
C. A. 521 (1912) ; Cumnnhngs v. .'elson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619 (1912) ; Fairbanks Morse Co. v. Twin City Supply Co., x7o N. C. 315, 86 S. E. 1oz
(ixiS). But it is noi within the province of the court to change the clear
meaning of the language used to protect one of the parties from his improvident contract. Gazos Creek Mill v. Coburn, 8 Cal. App. i5o, 96 Pac.
359 (19o8); Brobst v. Albrechi, i9 Pa. D. R. 989 (19io); Old Colony St.
Rwy. Co. v. Brockton, 218 'Mass. 84, 1o5 N. E. 866 (1914). The problem
is not the one that arises in quasi-contracts where the defaulting party
seeks to recover for what he has performed and so may be conscionably
entitled to part of the contractual benefits. Shaw v. Badger, 12 S. & R.
Pa. 275 (1825); McDonough v. Evans, iz2 Fed. 6 34 (D. C. xpow). In the
instant case the seller had performed no part of the contract. That the court
reached the result which it did in the present case is striking in view of the
frequent denial in England of recovery for. part performance where the
plaintiff has broken the contract. Sinclair v. Bowles, 9 Barn. & C. 9z
(Eng. 1829) ; Formnan & Co. Proprietary v. The Ship Liddesdale, (igoo) A.
C. Igo.
Though the case seems a hard one, there is little doubt that the decision of the court is correct. Just such a situation was foreseen by Scrutton, L. J. in Bourgeois v. Wlilson Holgate Co., 25 Com. ltas. 26o (Eng.
i919) where a similar contract was construed. Recovery could not be denied without disregarding the express terms of the contract, unless, indeed,
it should be held that the clause relating fo "invoicing back" had no application when there had never been a- shipment. The question of whether
a recovery would have been permitted had the plaintiffs' default been voluntary is raised but is left undecided.
CONTRACTS-FRAVD--NEGLIGENCE IN SIGNING.-The plaintiff's agent told
the defendant, an experienced business man, that a contract he presented
for the defendant's signature was the agreement which the parties had
previously made orally. The defendant signed the contract without reading
it. Later he learned that it omitted a material condition but stated that it
constituted the entire agreement. When the plaintiff sued on the contract,
the defendant set up that it had been procured by fraud. Held: Evidence
of fraud inadmissible. A verdict was directed for the plaintiff. J. B. Colt

Co. v. Britt, 123 S. E. 845 (S. C. 1924).

In attempting to weigh negligence against fraud in such cases, courts
have reached opposite results. While some have ruled sternly that a right
founded on fraud will not be enforced; Albany City Sap. Inst. v. Burdick,
87 N. Y. 40 (1881); Providence Jewelry Co. v. Crowe, 113 Minn. 2 09 , t29
N. AV. --4 (1911); others have applied the maxims caveat emptor and
vigilantibus non dormientibus sub'eniunt leges, and have stressed the sanctity of the written contract. Andrus v. St. Louis Smelting, etc., Co, 13o U.
S. 643 (1889); Dunham Luniber Co. v. Holt, 123 Ala. 336, 26 So. 663
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121 Wis. 14, 98 N. AV. 923 (904).
Where tle defendant was at some disadvantage in reading or understanding the contract, the law has been lenient with him; Endsley v. Johns, 12o
Ill. 469, 12 N. E. 247 (1887); Willlams v. Hanlton, 1o4 Iowa, 423, 73
N. W. io29 (i8);
and. where the plaintiff has induced the defendant
not to read it by more than the mere misstatement of its contents, most
courts have granted relief; Bates v. Harte, 124 Ala. 427, 26 So. 898 ( 1899);
Acmne Food Co. v. Older, 64 W. Va. 255, 61 S: ..235 (19o8); even where
the defendant has been overcredulous, Ljnington v. Strong, io- Ill. 295
(1883) ; but the jurisdiction of the principal case is strict in reqtiiring the
signer of a contract to read it. J. B. Colt Co. v. Freedman, iz4 S. C. 2!!,
117 S. E. 351 (1923),
In accord with the principal case are decisions which refuse to aid
one who will not help himself; Jagers v. Jagers, 49 Ind. 427 (1875); Internatiohal Textbook Co. v. Lezis, i3o Mo. App. 158, io8 S. W. 118 (i9o8);
and which say that the consequence is attributable to the signer's owrn fault,
since he had no right to rely .on the plaintiff's statement. Poland z.Brownell, 131 Mass. 138 (1881); Fivey v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 67 N. J. L

0898); Standard Mfg. Co. V. Slot,

627, 52 Atl. 472 (i9o2).

But it seems to be the tendency of the law to

limit the rule of caveat emptor and to allow a greater reliance on the word
of another. Buckley v. Acme Food Co., 113 I1. App. 210 (i9o3); Loter
v. Knospe, i44 Wis. 426, 129 N. V. 614 (1911) ; Smith and Co. v. Kimble,
31 S. D. 18, 139 N. W. 348 (1913). Jurisdictions which oppose the doctrine of the principal case hold -that fraud must be more strictly penalized
than negligence; Strand v. Griffith, 97 Fed. 854, 38 C. C. A. 444 (889);
Cummings v. Ross, 90 Cal. 68, 27 Pac. 62 (89); Shrimpton v. Philbrick,
53 Minn. 366, 55 N. W. 551 (1893) ; and refuse to allow the plaintiff to plead
that the defendant should not have trusted him. 1tale v. Philbrick, 42 Iowa
81 (1875) ; Warden, etc., Co. v. lWhitish, 77 Wis. 430, 46 N. AV. 54o (1890);
Maxfirld v. Schwartz, 45 Minn. I5o, 47 N. W. 448 (i8go)" These cases
argue that the wilful wrong of fraud is not offset by the careless fault of
negligence. They reject the suggestion of contributory negligence and point
out that to bar relief, "the intent to cause the harm must be met by the
intent to suffer it."
While it is acknowledged that the facts of any given case must be
weighed carefully to determine whether fraud or negligence is the greater
wrong, it is submitted that the principal case by penalizing negligence too
severely, and by dealing leniently with fraud for the sake of encouraging
prudence, inclines against the trend of the law.
COPYRIGHT--IxI:RINGMFs.q

r-ToY

DOLL

AS

CoPY OF CARTOON

CHARAC-

,rei.-The plaintiff, who owns the copyright of the "Barney Google and
Spark Plug" cartoons, sought to restrain the defendant from putting a
stuffed doll, an effigy of the horse, "Spark Plug," on the market, pending
a suit for infringement of his copyright. Held: Injunction granted. King
Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, et al., 2N9 Fed. 533 (C. C. A. 1924).
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Under the Copyright Act of 19o9, the plaintiff has the exclusive right
"to print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work," which
was the cartoon strip, "Barney Google and Spark Plug." Act of March 4,
sec. i (a), 35 STAT. AT L io75. To sustain -its decree the
1909, c. 3-20,
court decided that a stuffed doll, an effigy of "Spark Plug,' was a "copy"
of the cartoon character. In determining what is a copy, most decisions
seem to agree essentially that "a copy is that which comes so near to the
original as to suggest that original to the mind of every person seeing it."Hanfstaengl v. Smith & Sons, (igo5) i Ch. D. Sig. The test is limited
in the cases to visual observation. One court has laid down the formula,
"How does it look," Wilson v. Haber Bros., 275 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. i921;
and the Supreme Court refused an auditory test in White-Smith 31usic Co.
og U. S. i (i9o7), where it was held that a perforated
v. .Alpollo Co., -music roll was not a copy of a printed sheet of music, "an expression of a
collocation of sounds." In applying the visual test of copy, the courts have
granted the authors of copyrighted works the sole use of their "idea or
conception" even though the copy was in some other field of business, Bleinstein . Donaldson, 188 U. S. 239 (19o3), and did not impair the commercial value of the original. Falk v. Donaldson, 57 Fed. 32 (C. C. 1893). It
does not matter that the medium of expression be different, or that the Ucopy"
differ in size and material, or be used for a different purpose, if the substance of the words be taken. Fall v. Howell, 37 Fed. 202 (C. C. i888).
Copyrighted cartoons have been infringed by "copies" which were dramatic
plays on the stage, Hill v. JVhalen, 220 Fed. 359 (D. C. 1914), and living
pictures (tableaux). Bradbury, Agnew & Co. v. Day, 32 Times L. R. 349
(K. B. Div. 1916). A picture of a statue has been held to be a "copy"
in an opinion containing a dictum that a statue might be called a'"copy" of
a picture. Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 Fed. 136 (C. C. i907). In the instant
c.4se the relation of cartoon and doll seems analogous to that of picture
and statue.
There is no doubt that the defendant used the "idea" of the plaintiff
when he made the doll, and that the doll would instantly suggest the cartoon
to every mind. In view of the facts that differences of size and material
are not important, and that an infringement of a copyrighted work 'may
be in an entirely different field of commerce, it is submitted that the court
decided correctly that the stuffed doll was a "copy" of the cartoon. The
dccision was but an application, however new and unusual, of the existing
law.
CRtI AL L.W---FORMER JEOPARDY---"SAME TRAsAcT-rIo" AND INDENTITY
OF OFFENSES TEsTs N LiQU'oR PitosEcrToxs.-The defendant, indicted for

violation of liquor laws, pleaded former jeopardy based on an acquittal of
a charge of maintaining a "blind tiger." claiming the unlawful sales of
liquor for which he was prosecuted in the instant case were part of the
same transaction as the acts alleged in the first prosecution. Held: The
plea of former jeopardy must be based on the identity of offenses and not
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en the same transaction. Conviction sustained. Foran v. State, x44 N. E.
924).
529 (Ind.
The doctrine that no person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same
offense is provided for in the Federal Constitution (Amend. 5) and in most
of the state constitutions. It is generally held to be merely declaratory of
the common law, U. S. v. Gilbert. 2 Sumner 1g, 38 tU. S. C. C. 1834);
Comm. v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577 (Pa. 1822); Harris t?. State, 17 OkLa. Cr.
f9. 175 Pac. 627 (192o), and in Missouri is apparently only partially incorporated in the state constitution, with the common law prevailing in so
far as it is not modified by constitutional or statutory provision. State v.
In England the doctrine is not
Liton, 283 Mo. 1, 222 S. W. 847 (920),
in the nature of a constitutional safeguard, but is rather a matter of practice. See BisHor, CRIMII AL Lw, par. 982.
The rule against former jeopardy is often limited in its application
only to a second prosecution for the identical act and crime, both in law
and fact, for which the first prosecution was instituted; as the Court said
in State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, io6 N. E. 5o (1914), "the words 'same
offense' mean same offense, not the same transactions, not the same acts,
not the same circumstances or same situation." Burton v. U. S., 2o2 U. S.
344 (z9o5); Campbell v. People, iog Ill. 56 (1885). So in Johnson v.
ComM., 256 S. W. 388 (Ky. i923), betting on each hand in stud poker at same
sitting was held a separate offense, so that prosecution for one did not bar
prosecution for another. But it is frequently held that where two offenses
arise out of the same transaction, prosecution for one bars prosecution for
the other. State v. Colgate, 31 Kan. 511, 3 Pac. 34 6"(1&84 ) ; Roberts v. Slate,
14 Ga. 8 (1853). A striking example is Fiddlerv. State, 7 Humph. so8 (Tenn.
1847), where a conviction of racing a horse on a public street was held a
bar to prosecution. for betting on that race, though it was admitted each was
a separate offense. Generally, however, the offenses are more closely
merged, see State -z. Damon, 2 Tyler 387 (Vt. 1803), sometimes so closely
as perhaps to come properly within the well recognized principle that where
one offense is but a lower degree of a greater offense, as manslaughter to murder. or is an essential ingredient of a greater offense, such as assault to assault
and battery, a conviction or acquittal of one will bar prosecution for the other.
For discussion and classification see Elder v. State, 65 Ind. 282 (1879) and
State v. Colgate, supra.
The application of these rules in the prosecutions of violations of liquor
laws has resulted in some confusion. Thus specific sales may be prosecuted
after prosecution as a common seller. State v. Coombs, 32 Me. 529 (185);
State v. Cleaver,
State v. Marchindo, 6s Mont. 431, 211 Pac. 1093 (i-2);
i96 Iowa i278, x96 N. IV. 19 (1923). Contra, State z. Nut, 28 Vt. 598
(1856). In Massachusetts conviction as a common seller bars prosecutions
for specific sales. Comm. . Jenks, i Gray 490 (Mass. 1854), but an acquittal
does not have a like effect. Comm. v. Hudson, 14 Gray ii (Mass. 1859). Recent cases seem to recognize that unlawful possession of liquor is so much
a part of unlawful selling or manufacturing as to make the "same transaction" test more just, even though both are distinct offenses. State v. Lib.-
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ton, supra; Coulter t- Stale, 94 Tex. Cr. Rep. 96, 252 S. W. 168 (1923);
New',ton v. Colnm., 198 Ky. 707, 249 S. W. 1017 (1923); see Morgan v. State,
In the principal case the defendant
28 Ga. App. 358, 111 S. E. 72 (1922).
apparently attempted to persuade the court to make an exception in liquor
cases to the settled law of the state, the "same transaction" test having been
definitely repudiated in Elder v. State, supra. The refusal of the court to
recognize such an exception marks an adherence to the strict test of former
jeopardy which it laid down in 1879, in the face of a tendency of other
states to apply to liquor prosecutions the more lenient "same transaction"
test.
CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL BY JuRY--VAiVER OF TRIAL BY TwEVa Juaoas.
-The relator was defendant in a prosecution for bank robbery. During
trial a juror was excused because of urgent necessity, and with the defendant's consent the trial proceeded with eleven jurors. In his appeal to
the Superior Court, no exception to this proceeding was taken; but a year
and a half after his conviction was sustained, he petitioned for his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that his trial was a
nullity. Held (inter alia): The trial was not invalid and the defendant
is bound by his waiver. Comm. ex rel. Sam Ross v. John Egan, Warden,
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Miscellaneous Docket No. 367, 1924.
The question whether in a trial for felony a defendant could make
a binding waiver of the usual number of jurors has never come before an
appellate 'court of Pennsylvania. It had already been decided, however,
that a trial of a misdemeanor under such circumstances was valid. Comm.
From, the diverse rulings in the vav. Beard, 48 Pa. Super. 319 (1911).
rious states much confusion has resulted, but it is almost universally held
that in civil cases a waiver of the right to a complete panel of twelve is
valid; by the great weight of authority, a similar waiver in misdemeanors
is binding, but is not in trials for capital offenses; but as to felonies less
than capital there is a decided conflict. See 43 L. R. A. 6o. In the Federal courts the rule is probably now settled that a waiver is not binding
even in misdemeanors. See 57 U. oF P.A. L. Rav. 32.
Much of the confusion can be resolved by a comparison of the various
constitutional provisions for trial by jury. See concurring opinion of Woods,
J., in State v. Cottrili,31 W. Va. z62, 6 S. E. 428 (1888) ; and State v. Baer,
Some provisions are held to be
io3 Ohio St. 585, i34 N. E. 786 (192i).
merely a guaranty of privilege, others mandatory that there must be a trial
by jury. In this connection it then becomes important to decide whether thewaiver of one juror involves the principle that a jury trial can be waived
entirely. If one juror can be waived, why not others, or all? Where is the
stopping point? Shaw, C. J., anticipated this query by saying no discreet
trial judge would allow too wide a divergence from the forms of trial. Comm.
.. Dailey, 66 Mass. So (1853). Practical though it may be, this answer does
not solve the, legal problem. In Iowa a sharp distinction between a waiver
of a trial by a full panel and an entire waiver of trial by a jury has been
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drawn. State v. Grosshciw. 79 Iowa 75, 44 N. W. 54i (189o). But it has
also been held the prohlem is the same. Jennings v. State, 134 WVis. 301, 114
N. V. 492 (i.S). And the reasoning of sonic courts indicates that they assumed, without discussion, that there was no distinction. State . Baer, supra.
Even if it be decided that the problems are not the same in principle, the
constitution must still be looked to, for there is still the question whether it is
mandatory that there be twelve men and no less comprising the jury. In view
of the importance of this constitutional aspect of ta.e problem, it is most surprising that it was not considered in the instant ca.;e. Nor ddes Comm. v.
Beard, supra, from *hich the court proceeded, refer ,o the constitution. States
whose constitutional provision is worded much the same as Pennsylvania's generally hold that there can be a waiver in misdemeanors and felonies. See full
discussion in State v. Baer, supra. It would seem, therefore, that the court
arrived at a sound conclusion, though it neglected the constitution and devoted
itself entirely to the question whether there was a valid distinction between
waiver in trial for felony and one in trial for misdemeanor. Its conclusion
that there is none seems entirely sound; even if the right of waiver in criminal
trials is governed largely by public interest, as suggested in 12 COL.L Rav. 163,
still there seems to be little reason to distinguish between two classes of crimes
between which the difference is merely technical. In re .1IcQuown, ig Okla.
347, 91 Pac. 689 (9o7).
Indeed, the original leading cases laid down general
rules intended to be applied to any grade of offense. Comn. v. Dailey, supra;
ConcenMi V. People, 18 N. Y. 128 (x858). And more recent cases are to same
effect, definitely including homicide in their application of the rule. State v.
Baer, supra; State v. Brownan, 191 Iowa 6o8, 182 N. W. 823 (i92); State v.
Ross, 597 N. W. 234 (S. D. x924). But it is doubtful, in view of remarks
in the principal case, whether the Pennsylvania courts are prepared to go sd
far as to include homicides in the rule.
CRIMi.s.L LAW-YEAR-AND-A-DAY RULE-I.nvoLt'.NTARY MANSLAUGHTER,-

The defendant was indicted for involuntary manslaughter, for causing a death

by the negligent operation of an automobile. The indictment disclosed on its
face that the victim died one year and two days after he was struck. The
defendant moved to quash the indictment. Held: Motion denied. Commonacalth v. Evatil, 5 Pa. D. & C. 1o5. (Q. S., Phila. Co., i924.)
The court argues that the common law writers, Hawkins, Coke, and
Blackstone, treat the year-and-a-day rule under the title "Murder," and do
not refer to it in writing of either voluntary or involuntary .nanslaughter; and
that therefore the rule cannot be applied to such a case as the one at bar.
From this reasoning, however, it would follow that the rule should not apply
to voluntary manslaughter either. Yet this is not the case, for the Court of
King's Bench in Rex v. Dyson, (1908) 2 K. B. 454, gave effect to it, and
there have been dicta in a number of American cases to the effect that the
year and a day rule governs both murder and manslaughter. Cominonuealth
v. Macloon, Ioi 'Mass. 1 (1,89) ; State v. Bantlcy, 44 Conn. 537 (1877). Indeed, the learned justice in the instant case himself admits that the rule was
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applied to the graver forms of manslaughter. Logically, the riile should extend to all forms of homicide.
The practical reasons against such an extension, however, are very
strong. The rule was evolved at a day when the science of rnedicine was
in embryo. Where a man died long after receiving a wound, the causal.
connection between the death and the stroke could not be determined accurately. But the reason for the rule has ceased to exist, and therefore the
.rule should cease as well. While it would be impossible for a court to
refuse to adhere to it in a case of murder or voluntary manslaughter,
there is no practical reason for extending it to such a case as the one at bar.
The court was bound by no precedent, for all the reported cases on the subject deal with voluntary manslaughter. The decision is a refusal to allow the
logical application of archaic principles to hinder the working of justice.
INsrRANc MrANs-D-.Tt

VIOLENT A N 0 ACCIDENTAL
CONSTR.'cTloN -"ExTERNAL,
ny TYPHoiD.-A railroad employee drank water from pipes

intended to carry drinking wziter, but which, because of a defective valve, contained polluted water, from which he contracted typhoid fever and died. Held:
That death was caused by "external, violent and accidental means" within the
meaning of an insurance policy. Christ v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., x44 N. E.
161, I1. (1924).
It is a well-settled rule, as laid down in United States Miutual Accident
Ass'n. v. Barry, 131 U. S. ioo (189) that if the act which precedes the injury, though intentional, produces something unforeseen, unexpected, and unfusual. the injury is accidentally caused. But some cases hold that where the
insured has done the precise act which he intended to do and his act has produced a consequence which he did not foresee, there is no liability. Smith v
Travelers' Ins. Co., 219 Mass. i47, io6 N. E. 6o7 (1914).
In holding the insurers liable in policies insuring against accidental death,
the courts have generally followed the rule of interpretation which resolves
doubts as to the meaning of ambiguous language against the party who has
drawn up the contract. This enables them to give a liberal construction of
the policy in favor of the beneficiary, since the insurance company draws up
the policy. Thus, in Higgins v. Midland Casualty Co., 281 Ill.
43t, 118 N. E.
Ix (1917),

it was held that sunstroke was a bodily injury sustained through

accidental means. Arsenic poisoning contracted in the course of employment,
resulting in death, was within a policy insuring against death by accidental,
external and violent means, _latthiesscn & 11egeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial
Board, 284 I1. 378, i-o N. E. 249 (1918) ; so also were inhaling of gas, Paul v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472, 20 N. E. 347 (1&39); suffocation by drowning, Clark v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 156 Iowa 201. 135 N. W' 1114
(1912) ; eating of tainted food, Johnson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 184 Mich.
406. 151 N. W. 593 (19x5

; opening of a pimple, causing fatal infection, LewLis

v. Ocean Accident Corp.. 224 N. Y.
by the insured's horse running away.
So MC. 251, 14 AtM 13 (188). And
denial as regards the insured. Thus,

iS, i2o X. E. 56 (i918); fright caused
McGlinchlry v. Fidelitv & Casualty Co.,
it is only necessary that the act be accian intentional murder of the insured was
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held to be occasioned by the happening of an external, violent and purely

accidental event. Mabee 71. Continental Casualty Co., 37 Idaho 07, 219
Pac. z98 (1923). But a fall because of illness is not caused by accidental
means, and death resulting from an injury so received is not accidental within
the policy. Aetna Life Ins. Co. T. Robinson, 262 S. W. ii8 (Tex. 1924).
In the principal case, the disease producing death was itself the effect
of an accident, and in such a situation, the courts hold that the death is attributable to the accident alone. Western Commercial Travelers, .As',. %,.Smith,
85 Fed. 401, _-9 C. C. A. 223 (,98).
While it would seem that the policy
uas drawn up to include only death occasioned by a violent accident, nevertheless, the decision reached by the court is in accord with the great weight of
authority.'
LARcENx-DEosiT

OF PROCEEDS

IN

BANK-ABIIT\Y

OF OwF aat To TRACE

RrcovER.--The owner of bonds placed them in a safe deposit box in Bank
A. The cashier of the A Bank. who was also a partner therein, stole them
from the box, and received a check for tle proceeds, which he deposited in
the B Bank to the credit of the A Bank. The latter became insolvent, and the
owner of the bonds petitioned the cotrt that the proceeds of the larceny
be paid over to her. The A Bank had at all times on deposit in the B Banlk
funds in excess of the proceeds from the sale of the securities. Held' The
plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds. Conneautlille Bank's Assigned Estate, V8o
Pa. 545, 124 At. 745 (1924).
Although the relationship of the holder of a safe deposit box and the
bank in which the box is located is an anomalous one, the courts regard it
as one of bailment. National Safc Deposit Co. v. Stead, 25o 11. 584, 95 N.'E.
973 (I91) ; Reading Trust Co. v. Thompson. 254 Pa. 333, 98 At. %3 (iI6).
A trust relationship does not exist because the legal title to the contents of the
box remains in the depositor. The taking of the securities was larceny, and
the A Bank acquired no tile to tie bonds.
The court in the instant case unequivocally declares that the proceeds obtained from the sale of the stolen bonds cannot be considered as a trust.
Courts seek to preserve existing equities in certain cases by constructing
trusts, and the commonest examples of such constructive trusts are tn be
found where the legal title has passed through fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation. I PERRY ON TRUSTS (6th ed.), sec. 166, ct seq. There are cases
however, where the courts have impressed a trust upon the proceeds of a larceny. Newton v. Porter,69 N. Y. 133 (1877) ; Aetna Indemnit, Co. v. Malone, 89 Neb. ,6o, 131 N. W. 2o (19II) ; contra, Chambers -'. Chambers, 98
Ala. 454, 13 So. 674 (1892).
The principle is well settled that a cestui que trust may pursue trust funds
as long as he can trace them, and where the bank, in which such funds have
been deposited, becomes insolvent, the estui que trust is entitled to have his
trust funds segregated. In re Hallett's Estate, L R. 13 Ch. Div. 696 (1879);
Cook z-. Tullis. 18 Wall. 332 (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1873) ; Wl'oodhouse v. Crandall,
197 11. io4, 64 N. E. -292 (i 9 o2t. Preference is allowed even where the trust
AND
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funds have lost their identity in a general account, provided that there has
existed at all times funds sufficient to discharge the trust res. National Bank
.. Insurance Co., Io4 U. S. z. 68 (x8x) ; Hezitt v. Hayes. 2o Mass. 356, 91
N. E. 332 (19Io). In Neuton v. Porter, supra, the owner of stolen bonds
was permitted to follow the proceeds of their sale as a trust into the hands
of the thieves and their confederates, while in Aetna Indemnity Co. Z,.
Malone,
supra, the proceeds derived from a bank robbery were permitted to be followed
as a trust res.
The decision in the instant case undoubtedly follows a modern tendency
to accord relief under such circumstances, although the courts ordinarily achieve
such a result by first impressing with a trust the proceeds of the larceny.
The failure of the court to impress a trust in the present case probably may
be explained by the fact that there was no equity jurisdiction in Pennsylvania until early in the Nineteenth Century, and as a result, certain equitable
remedies have had a limited development and application in that jurisdiction.
NAMES-MARRIFED

\WOMEN-RIGHT

To

RETAIN

MAIDEN.

NAMEs.-The

Comptroller-General of the United States ruled that a married woman in
government employ must sign her married name to the payroll in order to
draw pay. Doctor X, a married woman employed by the government who
had retained her maiden name, protested against this. The case has not
been decided by the courts. See II EQUAL RIGHTS XOS. 29, 3.
The ruling appears to be based on the belief that while a married woman
may have an assumed name, she has but one legal name, i.e., her husband's
surname. It is well settled that a personal name is not a matter of law, but
of fact, and can be changed at will; Re Snook. 2 Hilt. 566 (N. Y. 1859);
Linton v First Nat. Bank, 16 Fed. 894 (C. C. 1882) ; see G. S. Arnold, 15
YALE L JoUR. 227, reviewed in i9 H..ARv. L. REv. 549; although a certain
amount of user is hecessary before the new name is acquired, either as evidence of a bona fide intention to keep the name; Smith v. U. S. Casualty Co.,
197 N. Y. 42o, go N. E. w4i (i9io); or to assure identification. Laflin and
Rand Co. v. Steytler, 146 Pa. 434, 23 At]. 2i_; (1892); Loser v. Plainfield'
Savings Bank, 149 Iowa 672, 128 X. W. 11o (191o); Everett v. Standard
Ace. Ins. Co., 45 Cal. App. 332, 187 Pac. 996 (1919).
The statutes which
provide for a change of name by the Legislature, or by decree of court,
are without exception held to be permissive; that is, they simply provide a
convenient means of record and of notice to 'the public, so that the change
is immediate. Smith v. U. S. Casualty Co., supra; In re McUlta, 189 Fed.
250 (D. C. 19n1); State v. Ford, 89 Ore. 121, 172 Pac. 802 (ig8).
A married woman is not excluded from the benefits of these general rules, and
can acquire a new name by usuage. Clark v. Clark, 19 Kan. 2 (1878);
Parmelee v. Raymond, 43 Ill..
App. 6og (89-); see i LAw; Noms 164. Divorce statutes generally provide for a resumption of the maiden name by
decree of court, but since a divorced woman can assume her maiden name
without such a decree; Fendall v. Goldsmnid, L. R. 2 Prob. Div. 263 (i8a7);
Rich v. Mayer, 7 N. Y. Supp. 69 (889) ; these statutes must also be taken as
permissive. Accordingly, it appears that if Doctor X had gone by her mar-
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ried name, she could have regained her maiden name by a certain amount of
user; for immediately upon marriage a woman customarily assumes her husband's name; Frcenan v. Hawkins, 77 Tex. 498, 14 S. W. 364 (89o)) ; Carrall v. Statc, 53 Neb. 431, 73 X. W. 939 (i898); Schouler, MaIR1ACE, Di66; and it can be
V'OncE, SEPARATIOV AND DOF.XtSTIC RELATIONS, (6th ed. i92)
changed only in the usual way. However, this assumption of the husband's
surname seems not to be in accordance with any rule of law, but simply
a recognition of custom. Therefore, if the woman did not acquiesce in
the custom, but persisted in the use of her maiden name, as 'in the instant
case, it would seem that she would not gain a new name by marriage, but
would retain her former name. Since Doctor X's maiden name is her
legal name, we are. forced to conclude that the basis of the ComptrollerGeneral's ruling is unsound.
TORTS-FR.UD---.fISREPRESENTATIO.N

AS TO PARENTAG.-The plaintiff was

taken into defendants' home in 1887, shortly after birth, under a contract
with the county to keep her for eighteen years, and she lived there until
i912. The plaintiff now complains that "defendants, with intent to deceive
her, led her to believe, and she did believe, that she was defendants' natural
child," that, on account of this belief, she "performed a woman's work in
the household and a man's work in the field" of defendants from i9o5 to
i912, which services were worth $25oo; that they intentionally encouraged
and sustained such belief, by which she was deceived and defrauded. The
defendants demur. Held: Demurrer sustained. Miller v. Poler,.et at., 199
N. W. 97 (Minn. 1924).
"The court denied relief to the plaintiff by reasoning in this manner:
This action sounds in tort. I-f the facts disclosed constitute a cause of
action, it must be upon the theory that defendants violated a legal duty in
concealing from plaintiff, when she arrived at her majority, 'the truth concerning her parentage. The court finds that there was no duty to make
such" disclosure.
It is submitted that the court decided the case on a point foreign to the
gist of the complaint. The plaintiff does not contend that she was damaged by the failure to disclose, by the "silent deception" as the court terms
it. The plaintiff contends that she was damaged by the open fraud and
deceit of the defendants, that on account of her belief in the state of facts
which the defendants induced and encouraged her to believe, she performed
valuable services for the defendants without any compensation. The defendants admit these allegations by their demurrer. Is it not unjust to permit
the defendants to profit by their own fraud and to deny to the innocent
plaintiff the damage occasioned her by defendants' conduct?
In a case with almost similar facts, Graham v. Stanton, admin'x., 177
Mass. 321, 58 N. E. io23 (igoi), in which the plaintiff was taken into the
house of defendantfs intestate and performed services induced by the false
representation tha, she had been legally adopted, Holmes, J., speaking for the
court, says: "If there was any evidence of fraud . . . , it is settled . . .
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that the remedy is an action" of tort for the deceit and that a contract is
not to be implied." In the Minnesota case, there was a misrepresentation as
to the plaintiff's status, and this misreprcsentation was intentionally continued
during the whole period of plaintiff's stay with the defendants, in order to
call forth the faithful services, free of cost, of a servant and hired man combined. The good motive of the foster-parents is immaterial; a course of
action is no less fraudulent because it is inspired by a profiting benevolence.
Foster v. Charles, 7 Bing. io5 (Eng. i83o) ; Lord Blackburn in Smith v.
Chadu'ick. L. R. 9 App. Cas. 187 (1884), at page 2oi.
The complaint does not disclose any procedural difficulties. Although
the rule at common law seems to deny a child the right to sue its parent
in a civil action for an injury referable to the period of minority; McKclvcy
t. ilcKclz'cy, III Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664 (i9o3),
(cruel treatment by
stepmother) ; Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (195o), (rape by
father) ; this rule does not apply to one in loco parcntis, especially when the
child has been taken from the custody of its foster parents. Clasen v. Pruhs,
69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 64o (19o3): This is all the more true when the adult
foster child is seeking relief for an injury referable to the period of majority. The Minnesota Statute of Limitations-'the cause of action shall not
be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of
the facts constituting the fraud"-was not a bar to the action, as the plain.
tifi alleged she had not discovered the fraud until within six years next
before the action was commenced. Minn. Gen. Stat. 1913, sec. 7701 (6);
Downer v. Union Land Co. of St. Paul, 113 MIfinn. 410, -'9 N. AV. 777 (191x).
TRUsTs AND TRLSTEES-DISCLA. NER BY CoNDL!cr-TiTIRTY YE RS WITHOUT Acrox HELD DisctLAi.vF.-;A, B and C were appointed trustees of land
under a will. Thirty years after his appointment A died having taken n
action to accept or disclaim the trust. B and C had died prior to A's death
and C's executor had appointed new trustees. A purchaser of the land from
these trustees demanded proof of a disclaimer by A and commenced action
to recover back a deposit he had made toward the purchase price. Held:
The deposit could not be recovered since by his thirty years of inactivity
A had disclaimed the trust. In re Clout and Frewer's Contract, (1924) 2 Ch.
230.

No person is bound to act as a trustee. If he disclaims by word or act
the disclaimer is valid. Staccy t. Elph, r Myl. & K. i95 (Eng. 1833) ; Dbdge
v. Dodgc, iog Md. 164, 71 At. Sxg (igoS). But it is stated by text .writers
that if the trustee does nothing he is presumed to have accepted the trust,
and that the longer he remains inactive the greater is the presumption of

acceptance.
TRUSTEES,

ARCHER, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, 282; FLINT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND
t-wI,TRUsTs (12th ed.) 2z4. The earliest case on which

z79; L

this principle rests decided that in order- to determine when title
passed under a deed of surrender acceptance would be presumed until
it was disclaimed. Thompson v. Leach, 2 Vent. 198 (Eng. 692). Of the
later cases which accepted the rule on the authority oftThompson v. Leach.
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either the acceptance or the disclaimer could usually be proved from the
acts of the trustee. Doyle v. Blake, 2 Sch. & Lef. 231 (Ire. 1804);
Toaiison v. Tickell, 3 Barn. & Ald. 31 (Eng. 1819); Eyrick v. Hetrnck, 13 Pa. 488 (i8So) ; Barclay v. Goodloc's Executors, 83 Ky. 493 (884).
In Ireland Lord Chancellor Sugden applied the rule in two cases, in one
of which the trustee had failed to act for twenty-three years, In re Uniacke,
i J. & Lat. r (Ire. x844) ; and in the other of which the non-action had continued for thirty-four years. In re Needham,
J. & Lat. 34 (Ire. 1844).
These cases are rejected in the instant case, which adopts the iule of. In re
Gordon, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 53r (1877), in which non-action for three years
by an executor-trustee who had renounced probate but had not disclaimed
the trust was held to be a sufficient disclaimer; and of In re Birchall, L R.
!4o Cli. Div. 436 (1S$9), where a trustee refused to act but nine years later
attempted to exercise trust powers and it was held that he had disclaimed
by his failure to act. The later American cases seem to be in accord with
the instant case in that non-action is taken as evidence as a disclaimer. In
the mater of George W. Robinson, 37 N. Y. 261 (1867); Adams v. Addans,
64 N. H. 224, 9 At. 1oo (886) ; Brandon-v. Carter, i19 Mo. 5"2, 24 S. IV.
io35 (1893). This is in accordance with the general principle that one cannot be compelled to take positive action to escape a duty which another
seeks to impose upon him.

